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TREATING CHILDREN UNDER THE NEW MEXICO
MENTAL HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES CODE
JAMES W. ELLIS*
DOROTHY KAY CARTER**

Developing legal rules for the mental health treatment of minors is
a problem which has perplexed many courts and legislatures in the
last decade. The United States Supreme Court considered the issue
of institutional commitment procedures for three years before producing its controversial ruling on one aspect of the issue.' Other
courts have considered the same issue and have reached different
results. 2 In addition to the procedures required for commitment,
other important problems include confidentiality rights, consent to
treatment, regulation of the provision of treatment, periodic review,
educational issues, the role of counsel, and special legal problems involving mentally retarded children. Each of these issues has received
some attention from the courts and legislatures of various states, but
New Mexico appears to be unique in its attempt to address them all
in a comprehensive legislative enactment.
New Mexico's experience may prove useful to other states as they
consider changes in their own laws. Although the United States
Supreme Court ultimately refused to strike down the commitment
statutes of Georgia and Pennsylvania, 3 the controversy which those
cases engendered led several states to change their own statutes4 and
some may choose to consider the details of their laws. Still other
states may find that issues such as treatment and confidentiality re*Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law; A.B., Occidental
College, 1968; J.D., University of California at Berkeley, 1974.
*Captain, United States Air Force; Member, Class of 1981, University of New Mexico
School of Law; B.S. Economics, University of Minnesota, 1968.
1. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979); Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized
Juveniles, 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979). The majority held that the procedural due process guarantee
of the fourteenth amendment requires only limited procedural protections for children facing
institutionalization for mental illness or mental retardation, but that states are free to afford
children more formal procedures. See text following note 45 infra.
2. Kidd v. Schmidt, 399 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Saville v. Treadway, 404 F. Supp.
430 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298
(1977); Melville v. Sabbatino, 30 Conn. Supp. 320, 313 A.2d 886 (1973); In re Long, 25 N.C.
App. 702, 214 S.E.2d 626, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 241, 217 S.E.2d 665 (1975); Pyle v. Brooks,
31 Or. App. 479, 570 P.2d 990 (1977). For a case decided since Parham, see Johnson v.
Solomon, No. 76-1903 (D. Md., decided Aug. 17, 1979).
3. See cases cited in note I supra.
4. E.g. 1979 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 79-511, § 5; Iowa Code Ann. § 229.23 (West 1979); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 51.13 (West 1979).
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quire clarification and resolution, no matter what their rules of commitment may be.
This article will examine the New Mexico statutes and the policies
which they reflect. 5 Its purpose is both to assist New Mexico courts
and practitioners in the law's implementation, and to offer the benefit of this state's experience to other states which may be considering
some or all of these issues.
THE NEW MEXICO LEGISLATION: BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE
The enactment of the Code
Until 1977, mental health law in New Mexico was based on a version of the National Institute for Mental Health's Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill (hereinafter Draft Act). 6 A
number of states, including New Mexico, adopted this statute in the
early 1950's. 7 The Draft Act had been designed to incorporate the
latest in postwar psychiatric developments, and in particular to
reduce procedural impediments to hospitalization of mentally ill persons, on the theory that those procedures both stigmatized patients
and deterred them from obtaining needed medical treatment.,
Therefore it encouraged voluntary treatment and gave few real procedural protections to those whose involuntary commitment was
proposed. As with most states which adopted the Draft Act, New
Mexico allowed the parents of minors to "voluntarily" place their
children in mental institutions9 and, by implication, to make other
medical decisions for those children regarding their mental health
care.
New Mexico's laws regarding the mentally retarded provided even
fewer protections of individual liberties. The law in effect in 1977
5. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 43-1-1 to -25
(Repl. 1979). The senior author was the principal drafter of the 1977 Code and participated in
drafting the 1978 and 1979 amendments.
6. National Institute of Mental Health, Federal Security Agency, A Draft Act Governing
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill (Public Health Service Pub. No. 51, 1951), text and commentary reprintedin The Mentally Disabled and the Law 454-73 (rev. ed. S. Brackel & R. Rock
1971).
7. 1953 N.M. Laws ch. 182, §§ I to 19, 25 (repealed and replaced by N.M. Stat. Ann.
§§ 43-1-1 to -5 (Repl. 1979)); 1951 Utah Laws ch. 113, §§ 64-7-28 to -52 (Supp. 1979). For a
comparison of the Draft Act to other state statutes of the 1950's and 1960's, see comparative
tables in The Mentally Disabled and the Law (1st ed. F. Lindman & D. McIntyre 1961).
8. For contemporary commentary on the Draft Act, see Weihofen, Hospitalizing the Mentally II1, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 837, 859-63 (1952).
9. The parent or legal guardian of any child under sixteen years of age could commit that
child for "observation, diagnosis, care, and treatment" if the child was "mentally ill" or had
"symptoms of mental illness." 1953 N.M. Laws ch. 182, § 2 (repealed by 1977 N.M. Laws ch.
279, § 24).
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was based on statutes enacted in the 1920's 'O during the eugenics
scare. During that period there was a widespread belief that mentally
retarded people represented a great danger to society. The conventional wisdom of that era held that the solution to this problem consisted of sterilizing the mentally retarded so they would not
"swamp" society with incompetence, and providing for strict lifelong segregation of retarded people from the rest of society." Some
of the more draconian aspects of these policies had been moderated
by practice and by statutory amendment in intervening decades, but
the core of the New Mexico statutes continued to reflect the design
enacted in the 1920's.
By 1977, it had become clear that major portions of New Mexico's
mental health and mental retardation laws were unconstitutional. I2
A large number of court decisions in the 1970's struck down provisions of other states' laws which were similar or identical to New
Mexico's. The largest number of these cases declared statutes unconstitutional for providing too few procedural protections to adults
facing civil commitment,' 3 or held institutional rules and conditions
to be constitutionally inadequate." In addition, by 1977 there were
several rulings that states could not permit parents to place their
children in mental institutions without some kind of hearing. II
A consensus developed that New Mexico's laws would have to be
revised. Lawyers for the Department of Hospitals and Institutions
first attempted to draft changes in the form of modifications of the
existing statutes. Drafting difficulties developed, largely because the
changes required by the new constitutional rulings were so drastic
that the 1953 structure was ill-suited to accommodate and coordinate
them. In the 1977 session, aware of the likelihood of litigation if it
did not act, the legislature chose to enact a completely new Mental
10. See 1925 N.M. Laws ch. 133.
II. W. Wolfensberger, The Origin and Nature of Our Institutional Models (1975).
12. See Note, Constitutional Problems of Civil Commitment Procedures in New Mexico, 6
N.M.L. Rev. 113 (1975).
13. See Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F.
Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Hawaii 1976),
declaratoryjudgment that amendatory legislation also unconstitutionalsub nom. Suzuki v.
Alba, 438 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Hawaii 1977); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb.
1975); Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Ky. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378
(M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974);
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacatedand remanded, 414 U.S. 473
(1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957
(1975), on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F.
Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
14. E.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); New York St. Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
15. See cases cited in note 2 supra.
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Health and Developmental Disabilities Code.'" This Code, which
took effect on July 1, 1977, was the product of consultation and
compromise between such groups as the Department of Hospitals
and Institutions,'I the New Mexico Psychiatric Association, the New
Mexico Council of Community Mental Health Services, the New
Mexico Association for Retarded Citizens, and a number of concerned individuals.
Relatively minor problems developed in the implementation of the
Code, and other groups, such as the district attorneys, which had not
been part of the original negotiations, expressed new concerns and
considerations about the operation of the Code. As a result, more
negotiations took place and amendments to the Code were enacted
in 1978 and 1979. 8 These amendments were intended to cure specific
problems; the basic policies and principles which formed the Code in
1977 remain intact.
Values andpolicy judgments underlying the Code
The Code sought to address two different kinds of mental
disabilities: "mental disorders" and "developmental disabilities."
Mental disorder' 9 is basically synonymous with mental illness and
consists of disorders which involve serious disruption of the thinking
process. Developmental disability,2 a term borrowed from federal
legislation, 2 ' encompasses a number of disabilities, of which the
most important for the purposes of the Code is mental retardation.
Mental retardation is defined by the American Association on Mental Deficiency as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and
manifested during the developmental period." 2 2 Thus mental retardation is a proper term only when the person in question has serious
intellectual impairment (often measured in terms of an intelligence
quotient) accompanied by major behavioral problems.
16. 1977 N.M. Laws ch. 253, § 1;1977 N.M. Laws ch. 279.
17. The Department of Hospitals and Institutions is now part of the Health and Environmental Department.
18. 1978 N.M. Laws ch. 161; 1979 N.M. Laws ch. 213.
19. The Code defines "mental disorder" as "the substantial disorder of the person's emotional processes, thought or cognition which grossly impairs judgment, behavior or capacity to
recognize reality." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-3(N) (Repl. 1979).
20. "Developmental disability" is defined by the Code as "a disability of a person which is
attributable to mental retardation, cerebral palsy, autism or neurological dysfunction which requires treatment or habilitation similar to that provided to persons with mental retardation."
Id. § 43-1-3(H).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1976).
22. Am. Ass'n on Mental Deficiency, Manual on Terminology and Classification in Mental
Retardation Il (rev. ed. H. Grossman 1977).
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The Code treats individuals with mental disorders and
developmental disabilities similarly in some respects and differently
in others. Some provisions apply equally to both groups, such as personal rights, representation by counsel, and confidentiality.2 " But
where the nature of the person's disability was thought to have direct
relevance to his or her legal rights, the groups are treated differently-most notably regarding commitment procedures. 24 On the
most important issue, however, the groups receive the same treatment, namely the Code's recognition that the individuals in question
are citizens entitled to full rights of citizenship and to protection of
their liberty.
Because the Code is based upon the value of individual liberty, its
provisions were designed to avoid unnecessary institutionalization
and to reflect a presumption that individuals can and should, wherever possible, make their own decisions regarding treatment or
habilitation.2 5 The protection of individual liberty is also at the core
of the requirement that treatment or habilitation be provided in a
manner consistent with the least drastic means principle. 26 This principle acknowledges the potential benefit of community-based services and the potential harms of institutionalization. It also recognizes that treatment goals may be met with greater or lesser intrusion
of individual freedom, and mandates that steps be taken to reduce
the number and extent of those intrusions as much as possible. For
example, when treatment could be provided for a given client either
in a large state institution or on an outpatient basis in the client's
home community, the least drastic means principle requires that the
state choose the latter option.
23. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-6 (Repl. 1979) (personal rights); id. § 43-1-4 (legal representation of clients); id. § 43-1-9(D) (disclosure of information).
24. Only clients with mental disorders (mental illnesses) may consent and receive residential
care on a voluntary basis. Compare N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-13 with § 43-1-14 (Repl. 1979).
25. Habilitation is defined as
the process by which professional persons and their staff assist the developmentally disabled client in acquiring and maintaining those skills. and behaviors
which enable him to cope more effectively with the demands of his own person
and of his environment and to raise the level of his physical, mental and social
efficiency. Habilitation includes but is not limited to programs of formal, structured education and treatment.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-3(K) (Repl. 1979). This is the currently accepted terminology of mental
retardation professionals. For a concise overview of modern approaches to habilitation of
retarded persons, see F. Menolascino, Challenges in Mental Retardation: Progressive Ideology
and Services (1977).
26. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-3(D) (Repl. 1979). See generally Chambers, Alternatives to Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 Mich. L.
Rev. 1107 (1972); President's Comm. on Mental Retardation, The Mentally Retarded Citizen
and the Law 485-527 (M. Kindred, J. Cohen, D. Penrod & T. Shaffer eds. 1976).
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In addition to individual liberty, the legislature was also concerned with the treatment and habilitation needs of mentally disabled citizens. The Code provides a statutory right to treatment for
those with mental disorders and a right to habilitation for those with
developmental disabilities.2" It further requires that this treatment or
habilitation be chosen and provided on an individualized basis, according to the terms of an individualized plan for each client.2 8 The
objective of this requirement is to improve the quality of care clients
receive and to increase the likelihood that their condition and level of
skills will improve as well. By mandating individualized care, the
legislature committed the state's mental health and developmental
disabilities facilities to treatment and habilitation only, and not for
use as human warehouses or places of detention.
Perhaps the most perplexing question facing any court or legislature in the area of mental health and retardation law is the proper
treatment of clients who are minors. Principles of individual liberty
and autonomy obviously have different implications for children. 29
This is true both because children are immature and inexperienced
and because their parents claim independent interests and rights.
Determining an appropriate balance between protection of the child
and deference to parental decision-making and family autonomy is a
difficult task. Whether New Mexico has struck the proper balance
with regard to every issue is a matter for others to judge.30 This article explores the reasons behind the particular choices made by the
legislature.
ADMISSION TO RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT OR HABILITATION
Overview and legislativepurpose
Until quite recently, it was almost universally true that American
states allowed the admission of minors to mental institutions upon
the application of their parents, with no requirement for further
hearing or review. 3 ' This practice was permitted by New Mexico law
until the adoption of the Code in 1977.2 Concerns about both the
27. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 43-1-7 to -8 (Repl. 1979).
28. Id. § 43-1-9.
29. See Teitelbaum & Ellis, The Liberty Interest of Children:Due ProcessRights and Their
Application, 12 Fam. L.Q. 153 (1978).
30. For comparison, see Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposalsfor ChangeMental Health Treatment of Minors, 2 Mental Disability L. Rep. 459-81 (1978) (model statute
and commentary).
31. Ellis, Volunteering Children: ParentalCommitment of Minors to Mental Institutions,
62 Calif. L. Rev. 840, 840 n.I (1974).
32. See note9supra.
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constitutionality and the practical workings of this system led New
Mexico, among other states, to reconsider the desirability of this
practice.
The constitutional concerns focused on the procedural due process
rights of children whose liberty was deprived by the state in institutionalization. Several courts concluded that confinement in a mental
institution was a sufficiently massive deprivation of a child's liberty
to warrant independent review of the parent's (and admitting physician's) decision that the child's condition required that he or she be
confined.3 3 The test established by the United States Supreme Court
for determining "how much process is due" calls for balancing three
factors: the nature of the individual right involved, the risk of erroneous decision-making without the requested procedural protections
and the likelihood that the requested protections will reduce the risk
of error, and the interest of the state in avoiding the requested procedures.34 Applying this test to the facts of juvenile admissions to
mental institutions, many courts and observers concluded that the
child's right to physical liberty and a normal noninstitutional childhood, combined with concern about the stigma attached to institutionalization for mental illness or mental retardation," constitutes a
personal right worthy of careful protection. The imprecision of
psychiatric diagnosis36 and of classification of mental retardation"
suggests the likelihood of errors in an unreviewed admissions process. Adversarial hearings to determine the necessity for confinement would serve the same purpose of error reduction for children
that they serve for adults. The state's interest, both financial and administrative, in avoiding hearings, seemed insufficient to outweigh
the personal interests involved.
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with much of this
analysis. In opinions by Chief Justice Burger in Parham v. J.R.38
and InstitutionalizedJuveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare, " the
Court concluded that while states were free to provide judicial hearings to children, the due process clause only required a less formal
process of inquiry by the admitting physician."0 The rationale for
33. See cases cited in note 2 supra.
34. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
35. See cases cited in note 2 supra;Ellis, supra note 31; Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 29;
Note, "Voluntary" Admission of Children to Mental Hospitals: A Conflict of Interest
Between Parentand Child, 36 Md. L. Rev. 153 (1976); Note, 48 U. Colo. L. Rev. 235 (1977).
36. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 579 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
37. See Larry P. v. Riles, No. 71-2270 RFP (N.D. Cal., Oct. 16, 1979).
38. 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
39. 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979).
40. 99 S.Ct. at 2506-07; 99 S.Ct. at 2527-28.
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this decision is somewhat obscure. While the Court devotes a considerable amount of discussion to the importance of parental decision-making, 4 ' closer scrutiny indicates that this cannot be the basis
of the Court's holding. If these were rulings meant to enforce
parents' constitutional rights to make decisions concerning their
children, the Court would not and could not have allowed states to
provide hearings if they wished to do so. The Court clearly left this
option open to the states.4 It would be illogical for the majority to
announce a new parental right and then immediately authorize the
states to infringe that right. Another indication that parental rights
were not central to the holdings of the cases is the fact that the Court
had before it in the Georgia case a subclass of children who had no
parents, and even for these children, the Court concluded that hearings were not constitutionally required prior to admission.4 3 Clearly
44
this denial cannot be premised upon a theory of parental rights.
Since Parham and Institutionalized Juveniles are not cases
primarily involving parents' rights, the rationale for the decisions
must be sought elsewhere. The Chief Justice and his majority appear
persuaded by the argument that the risk of error in the juvenile commitment situation is not unacceptably high, and also that judicial
hearings would not significantly reduce the likelihood of mistaken
commitments. 4" The majority is not explicit about why it chose to reject the contrary factual conclusions made by the trial courts below,
but it was apparently unpersuaded by those conclusions. Thus the
majority can be characterized as holding that states are free to provide more formal processes for children, but that in the absence of
such state legislation, the Court would not order such hearings
because it was not convinced that they were necessary or that they
would do much good if they were provided.
The Court's conclusion about the desirability of hearings for
children is based on factual and policy considerations which are
remarkably similar to those a legislature would confront when determining the desirability of such hearings. Legislatures, which have
before them witnesses and a variety of fact-finding devices, are free
to disagree with the Chief Justice about the importance of commitment procedures for children. We believe that the Court's "legislative" conclusions were wrong and that the New Mexico Legisla41. Parham,99 S. Ct. at 2504-05.
42. Id. at 2507.
43. Id. at 2511-13.
44. Only Mr. Justice Stewart, who concurred in the judgment, appears to have based his
conclusion exclusively on parental rights. Id. at 2513-15 (Stewart, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 2509. This is the second prong of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test. See note
34 supra.
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ture's conclusions embodied in the Code were correct, because we
believe that the risk of error is greater than that perceived by the
Court and because we believe that hearings can reduce unnecessary
institutionalization of children.
The New Mexico Legislature confronted competing demands
made in the name of children's best interest: the child's need for
treatment and the child's right to be free from unnecessary institutionalization. The legislature apparently concluded that both were
legitimate claims, and therefore designed a statutory system which
attempts to reconcile and balance them. The Code also reflects a
judgment that parents have legitimate concerns and rights regarding
the treatment or habilitation of their child, and that while parents
should not be given unreviewable discretion in these matters, their
rights should be protected and their concerns honored whenever that
is consistent with the interests of their child in both treatment and
liberty.
To accommodate these competing demands and interests, the
legislature devised a unique and somewhat complex system of juvenile admissions. The primary mechanism for such admissions is a
judicial hearing before the district court. The Code also provides for
voluntary admissions of juveniles under a limited set of circumstances because the legislature recognized that some older minors
should be able to participate in their own mental health treatment
decisions to a greater extent than the hearing mechanism allows, and
such minors and their families may have legitimate reasons for
wishing to avoid court proceedings.
The judicialhearingprocess
The court proceedings prescribed by the Code for juvenile admissions resemble adult commitments in many respects. There are,
however, provisions which reflect the legislature's conclusion that
important differences between adults and children should be
recognized. One such difference involves the substantive criteria for
commitment.
For an adult to be committed as mentally ill, he must be shown to
be suffering from a mental disorder and to present a likelihood of
serious harm to himself or others, and it must be shown that his
commitment would be consistent with the least drastic means principle."6 In the case of a child, the court need not conclude that the child
46. These criteria must always be met, both for short term (not to exceed 30 days) commitment for evaluation and treatment, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-11(C) (RepI. 1979), and for extended commitment. Id. § 43-1-12(C).
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is dangerous to himself or to others. In addition to the requirements
of a mental disorder and the least drastic means principle, the court
need find only that the child "needs and is likely to benefit from the
treatment or habilitation services proposed" and "that the proposed
commitment is consistent with the treatment needs of the minor. '
This less rigorous standard makes it possible to place a child in a
residential facility when a similarly situated adult could not be committed."8
The different substantive standard for children recognizes that the
state may exercise a greater interest in the welfare of children than it
may constitutionally exercise with adults. The United States
Supreme Court has long held that states have more expansive power
to protect the well-being of children than they have in cases involving
adults. ' 9 The issue of commitment standards seems an appropriate
place to exercise that greater interest. The due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment protects adults from involuntary confinement when the state's only justification is that the state knows the
individual's needs better than the individual does." States are
justified in concluding that this same protection does not extend to
children whose judgment is more suspect than that of adults. The
state may legitimately conclude that a child's objection should not be
sufficient to prevent treatment when it is clearly shown that the child
needs and would benefit from treatment.
There is also a secondary and more practical justification for
treating children differently from adults in this regard. Adults who
"need" treatment but are not dangerous are not committable, but
they may seek treatment on a voluntary basis. 5 Nondangerous children who need treatment may not be able to admit themselves voluntarily because of their lack of capacity.52 If courts did not have the
power to order treatment for such children, a class of children would
be created that needed treatment, but could not receive it on any
basis-voluntary or involuntary. This result is avoided by the Code's
separate standard of commitment for children.
47. Id. § 43-1-16.1(G).
48. While the Code requires a showing of dangerousness for the involuntary commitment of
an adult for mental illness, the adult standard for developmental disabilities is somewhat less
rigorous. Compare §§ 43-1-11 (C) and-12(C) with § 43-1-13(E).
49. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158

(1944).
50. See Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Hawaii 1976); Doremus v. Farrell, 407
F. Supp. 509, 514 (D. Neb. 1975). The Supreme Court declined to rule directly on this question, but stated that "a finding of 'mental illness' alone cannot justify a State's locking a person up against his will . . .if [he is]dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom."
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
51. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-14 (Repl. 1979).
52. See text accompanying note 81 infra.
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The Code's procedures for the commitment of children thought to
need treatment or habilitation are designed to protect those children
from unnecessary confinement. In this respect they resemble the protections afforded adults. They include notice to the child and his
parents, representation by counsel, a hearing before a neutral fact
finder, provisions to insure that the hearing officer has sufficient
evidence to reach a reasoned decision, and the right to appeal.
A. The petition.
The Code provides that any person who believes that a child needs
residential treatment or habilitation may petition the court for his
commitment." The legislature envisioned that the petitioner would
be the child's parents or guardians in almost all cases. However,
other persons are authorized to file such a petition. This allows the
court to consider a child's need for treatment even when the child's
parents are unable or unwilling to propose his commitment. It would
be unreasonable and probably unconstitutional to read this provision as granting to the court the power to remove a child from his
home when the parents wish the child to remain in the home and
have not been found to be neglectful. ' Such a reading would allow
evasion of the substantive and procedural protections afforded
parents by the Children's Code, and the legislature clearly did not
intend such a result. The better reading of the provision is that it
allows petitions to be filed by interested persons other than parents,
but that a court may remove a child from a family who wishes to
keep him in the family home only upon a finding of neglect as provided in the Children's Code.
Whether the petition is filed by the parents or by another person,
it must contain certain specific items of information. As with petitions for the commitment of an adult, it must include a detailed
description of the symptoms or behaviors of the minor which support the petition's allegations," and a list of prospective witnesses
along with a summary of their anticipated testimony.5 6 These
53. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-16.1(B)(Repl. 1979).
54. The Supreme Court addressed the question of state power in a recent unanimous opinion saying:
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended "[i]f a
State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and
for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best
interest."
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (citing Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
55. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-16.1(B) (Repl. 1979).
56. Id.
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requirements allow the child and his lawyer adequately to prepare a
response to the petition. A petition which contains only "boilerplate" allegations does little to assist the child and clearly would be
inappropriate under this provision. The "notice" function of the
petition is implemented by the requirement that copies must be
served upon the child, and upon his parents if they were not the petitioners. 5 '
B. Representation by counsel.
The commitment system established by the Code places great
reliance on the performance of the child's lawyer. While the Code
does not treat children as if all of them are incapable of participating
in their own treatment decisions, it does recognize that all of them
will need assistance in sorting out their available options and in making their case. Because of the heavy emphasis on the role of counsel,
the legislature enacted explicit provisions about what the child's
lawyer is to do.
Once counsel is retained or appointed, 5 8 he must meet with the
child and clearly explain the procedural and substantive rights afforded by the Code.5 9 This counseling function is extremely important. Children who are thought (at least by the petitioner) to be mentally ill or developmentally disabled may well be confused about
what is happening to them. While others, such as parents or physicians, will probably have explained to the child what treatment or
habilitation is proposed, there remains a need for counsel to place
these proposals and events in the context of the child's legal rights,
and to explain to the child that there may be alternatives to what is
proposed.6" For some children, an issue of trust may also be involved. Some minors may not feel comfortable discussing their options with the parents and physicians who are proposing institutionalization. Because counsel's only job is to advise and represent
the child, he may be in a unique 6position to help the child sort out
what the child really desires to do. '
57. Id.
58. Upon receiving a petition for involuntary commitment, the court must ascertain whether
or not the child has retained an attorney to act as his or her counsel in the commitment proceedings. If not, the court must appoint counsel to represent the child at all stages of the proceeding. Id. § 43-1-16.1(C). Pursuant to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-4 (Repl. 1979), the court is
under the same obligation to appoint counsel, if none has been retained, when it is notified of a
minor's voluntary admission. Id. § 43-1-16(F).
59. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-16(F) (Repl. 1979) details the procedural and substantive rights
which must be explained by counsel in reviewing a minor's voluntary admission.
60. See Ellis, supra note 31, at 881-90.
61. Id. at 888-90.
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The Code also calls for counsel to determine whether the child
wishes to waive his right to a commitment hearing.6 2 Waiver is possible only if the child fully understands his rights and options under
the law and freely chooses to enter residential treatment without a
hearing. 6 While the Code does not place a minimum age on the right
to waive a hearing, it is clear that the child's age and maturity, as
well as the nature and severity of his disorder or disability, will be
important factors to consider in determining whether his purported
waiver is valid. 64 If the attorney concludes after discussing the matter with the child that the child has sufficient capacity and information and has voluntarily chosen to waive his right to a hearing, he
shall submit a verified written statement to the court explaining the
child's wishes. If the court is satisfied that the child has validly
waived the right to a hearing, it may order the child placed in treatment or habilitation.6 5
C. The hearing.
Absent a waiver, a hearing is to be held within ten days of the
appointment of counsel. 6 The hearing may be before a judge of the
district court or before a special commissioner appointed by the
court.6 7 At this hearing the child is entitled to the same basic protections which are afforded to adults: representation by counsel; the
right to present evidence, including the testimony of a mental health
or developmental disabilities professional of the child's own choosing; the right to confront and cross-examine petitioner's witnesses;
and the right to have a complete record made of the proceedings."
The right to obtain the testimony of an expert witness of the child's
own choosing is especially important. Without this right, petitioner's witness may be the only expert before the court. This would
62. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-16.1(D) (Repl. 1979) provides that if the attorney determines
that a child understands his rights and wishes to waive the court hearing on the involuntary
commitment issue, then the attorney must submit a verified written statement to the court
which explains the attorney's understanding of the child's intent.
63. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-16.1(D) (Repl. 1979).
64. See generally Am. Ass'n. on Mental Deficiency, Consent Handbook (H.R. Turnbull ed.
1977).
65. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-16.1(D) (Repl. 1979).
66. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-16.1(E) (Repl. 1979) shortens this time period to seven days if
the child has already been admitted to a residential facility. This covers two sets of circumstances. First, the child may have been voluntarily admitted under section 43-1-16 and his
involuntary commitment is now sought (e.g., when he has sought his own release). Secondly,
the child may have been admitted on an emergency basis as provided for in section
43-1-16.1 (K) of the Code.
67. N.M. Stat Ann. § 43-1-20 (Repl. 1979).
68. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-16.1(F) (Repl. 1979).

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 10

create considerable unfairness because many of the questions at
issue in the hearing will be medical and technical in nature and the
court will need to rely upon expert witnesses to sort out the facts and
reach a just conclusion. The child's right to his own expert is therefore a logical and necessary outgrowth of the right to effective
representation by counsel. It should help the court prevent the proceedings from becoming the equivalent of an ex parte hearing. 9
After hearing the evidence and argument, the court may order the
child committed if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 7"
(1) that as a result of mental disorder or developmental
disability the minor needs and is likely to benefit from the treatment or habilitation services proposed; and
(2) that the proposed commitment is consistent with the treatment71needs of the minor and with the least drastic means principle.

As noted above, this standard is less rigid and more oriented toward
treatment needs than the standard applied to mentally ill adults.7 2 It
is not, however, merely a rewording of a "best interest of the child"
standard. The court must specifically find that the treatment or
habilitation proposed (and not merely confinement) will meet the
child's individual needs in a way that no less drastic form of treatment or habilitation can achieve. Therefore, for example, a mere
finding that the child is developmentally disabled and needs habilitation services will not be sufficient to support an order to place that
child in the Los Lunas Hospital and Training School. To order such
a placement, the court would also have to find that the proposed
habilitation plan for the child at Los Lunas is appropriately tailored
to that child's individual needs and that the same or better result
could not be obtained in another setting, such as a group home or a
day program or specialized assistance to the child's parents.73
As the preceding example suggests, the court's task in these cases
69. The rights to counsel and to be heard in civil commitment proceedings are hollow
without resort to an examination by and testimony from a mental health professional of one's own choosing. Without the assistance of one's own examiner, the
individual and his lawyer can usually be expected to be ill-prepared to rebut the
adverse testimony of (the state's expert witnesses.
Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposalsfor Change-Civil Commitment, 2 Mental Disability L. Rep. 73, 104 (1977).
70. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); accord, In re Valdez, 88 N.M. 338, 540 P.2d
818 (1975).
71. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-16.1(G) (Repl. 1979).
72. In order to be involuntarily committed, an adult must always be shown to present a
likelihood of serious harm to himself or others. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
73. See F. Menolascino, supra note 25; G. O'Connor, Home Is a Good Place: A National
Perspective of Community Residential Facilities for Developmentally Disabled Persons (1976);
W. Wolfensberger, The Principle of Normalization in Human Services (1972).
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is most demanding. It must evaluate the petitioner's evaluation of
the child's needs and must also judge the acceptability of alternatives
which might be less restrictive of the child's liberty. Once again,
expert testimony and skillful presentation by counsel for both sides
are extremely important because the Code places the ultimate decision in the hands of a legally trained judge or commissioner rather
than in the hands of medical professionals. This placement of decision-making authority is necessary and appropriate because the ultimate question in each case is legal rather than technical: shall the
child be deprived of liberty in the manner proposed? The technical
and medical evidence is to aid a nonmedical inquiry, which is
whether that evidence is sufficient to sustain a decision to place a
child in an institution.
One final issue regarding the court's authority and responsibility
deserves mention: what should be done with children who do not
need the proposed commitment but who cannot return to their family home? This group will include children who do have a mental disorder or developmental disability, but whose treatment or habilitation needs do not require that the child enter an institution. The
Code clearly provides that the petition for commitment cannot be
granted in such cases, but the legislature also recognized that many
such children cannot, as a practical matter, return home. This may
be because disagreements between parents and child are too severe or
because the child's behavior or condition is too disruptive of the
family's life. But whatever the reason, without a specific legislative
provision on this point, the court would face a choice between unacceptable alternatives: placing the child in an institution whose services he does not need, or sending him back to a home where he is
not wanted and where emotional and/or physical damage to the
child or his family could result. The Code's response to this dilemma
allows the court to order alternative living arrangements for the
child (such as foster care) without having to find the parents to be
neglectful under the Children's Code.74 This solution allows an
appropriate placement for the child without forcing him into a home
in which he is unwelcome and without unnecessarily stigmatizing
parents.
D. Periodic review.
The legislature's decision to abolish indeterminate commitments
of adults7 also extends to children. The Code provides that any
74. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-34 (1978).
75. Id. § 43-1-12(C) (Repi. 1979) (six month to one year limits for mentally ill adults); id.
§ 43-1-13(E) (six month limit for developmentally disabled adults).
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order committing a child to residential treatment or habilitation
shall expire on a date set by the court at the time of the commitment.
The outer time limits for those expiration dates are sixty days for the
first commitment period, and six months for subsequent periods. 7"
The court is always free to set a shorter time period for a given commitment when it does not believe that the child's condition and treatment or habilitation needs warrant a period as long as the statutory
limits. Setting a shorter time limit would be appropriate even when
the court thinks the child's treatment or habilitation will require a
longer time period, if the court also concludes that the child's progress under his individualized plan should be reviewed earlier than
the outer limit prescribed by the Code. A shorter time limit may be
particularly desirable for subsequent commitment orders where the
allowable time limit for periodic review is six months.
To keep a child in confinement beyond the expiration date of his
commitment order requires a new hearing similar to the one which
the child originally either received or waived. The burden of persuasion thus remains with the petitioner (which will often be the residential facility in cases of subsequent commitments), which reinforces
the Code's presumption in favor of liberty and in favor of children
remaining in or returning to their own homes. However, the Code's
placement of the burden with the petitioner in recommitment proceedings may or may not accurately describe what actually happens
in such hearings. Despite the Code's presumption against institutionalization, counsel and courts may come to view periodic review
hearings as a form of habeas corpus proceeding in which the burden
is on the client to prove that he no longer needs confinement." While
this tendency is natural and understandable (especially in cases in
which the child's family is not eager for the child to return home), it
is a dangerous corruption of the Code's intent and may produce
unnecessarily long institutionalization which can be damaging to the
child. Once again, the practical burden of combating this possibility
rests with the child's counsel.
E. Appeals.
Appeals from the court's decision on a petition for commitment
lie in the court of appeals." Given the relatively short duration of the
commitment periods involved, it is not surprising that few appeals
76.
77.
tional
78.

Id. § 43-1-16.1(1).
The provision of periodic review hearings, however, does not limit the child's constituright to petition the court for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. § 43-1-16.1 (J).
Id. § 43-1-24.
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are actually taken. One unfortunate consequence of this fact is that
trial courts receive little guidance from the appellate courts regarding the Code's interpretation and implementation. Because the
Code is a relatively new and complex statute, this may be a serious
problem. The court of appeals has acknowledged the problem by
ruling that appeals from commitment orders may not be rendered
moot by the mere expiration of the commitment period, because
these cases fall within the category of cases "periodically arising but
evading review." 9 The court's view of these cases seems amply
justified.
The voluntary admissionprocess
One of the major criticisms of recent statutes, including New Mexico's, which give minors procedural rights prior to institutionalization, is that they fail to allow older juveniles to admit themselves
voluntarily for treatment. The New Mexico Legislature addressed
this problem in a 1979 amendment which attempted to allow some
minors to enter residential facilities by voluntary admission while
protecting the substantive and procedural rights of all minors.
This has proved to be a difficult problem. One way to recognize
the ability of some minors to make decisions about residential treatment would be to allow any minor to apply for voluntary admission.
The problem with this approach is that it would create the possibility
that some children would be coerced by their parents or by their
physician to "volunteer" in order to avoid the difficulties which the
parents might anticipate from a commitment hearing. Children
thought to be mentally ill or mentally retarded certainly do not, as a
group, have the resources to resist such pressures. Therefore a
legislative scheme which allowed unchecked voluntary admission of
minors would create incentives for coercion and fraud and would
probably produce the institutionalization of a considerable number
:f children who would not have been institutionalized had they been
iven the advice of counsel and the option of a hearing. The legisature was unwilling to accept such risks.
Instead, the legislature adopted an approach which allows some
teenagers to obtain voluntary admission within a system of safeguards established to assure true voluntariness and the adequacy of
their consent to admission. Such voluntary admission is available
only to minors who are twelve years of age or older and who seek
residential treatment for a mental illness.80 These limitations indicate
79. See State v. Pernell, 92 N.M. 490, 590 P.2d 638 (Ct. App. 1979).
80. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-16(B) (Repl. 1979).
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the legislature's judgment that there is not a significant number of
children under the age of twelve who have the maturity to reach an
informed judgment about their need for residential treatment. Similarly, these limitations reflect the conclusion that there is not a
significant number of children who need residential habilitation for
mental retardation or other developmental disability who possess
factual capacity to grant such consent." Therefore the mechanism
was made available only to older minors seeking treatment for mental illness.
The legislature also concluded that the voluntary admission procedure should only be available when the eligible minor and his
parent agree that the proposed treatment is desirable.8 2 Requiring
concurrent consent provides a further protection against unwise
decisions by minors to enter residential treatment. However, it also
creates the possibility that a minor who is mature enough to consent
to residential treatment but whose parents oppose it might be unable
to admit himself on a voluntary basis. The value of the parental
check was thought sufficient to justify a requirement that these
minors obtain treatment through the hearing mechanism of section
16.1.83
Eligible minors can become voluntary patients through the following process. When a minor and his parent have agreed that admission is desirable, they will both sign a "minor's voluntary consent to
admission document." 8' 4 This document must include a clear statement of the minor's rights concerning both admission and discharge.
The statute is quite explicit in its requirements concerning the consent process, reflecting a concern that all parties have full knowledge
of what it is they are consenting to. 85 The consent document is filed
in the child's hospital record, and the facility then has the responsibility to notify the district court of the child's decision and admission. 8 6 Within seven days of admission, the child must consult with
counsel, who has the responsibility of informing him of his rights87
and of ascertaining whether the child's voluntary consent appears to
be legally valid. 88 If the attorney concludes that the consent is valid,
81. A showing of capacity for consent on the part of a mentally retarded child may often be
the equivalent of a showing that the child does not require residential habilitation.
82. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-16(C) (Repl. 1979).
83. Id. § 43-1-16.1 (involuntary residential treatment of minors).
84. Id. § 43-1-16(C).
85. Id.
86. This notification must be accomplished "on the next business day of the court following
Id. § 43-1-16(E).
the minor's admission .
87. Id. § 43-1-16(F).
88. Id. § 43-1-16(G).
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he certifies this fact to the court.8 9 The child may then remain a
voluntary patient for up to sixty days.9" During a voluntary admission the child is free to seek his own discharge and is not under a
court order committing him to the facility. 91 If the child wishes to remain in the facility past the sixty days, the consent procedure outlined above must be repeated. 92
The Code places particular emphasis on protecting the child's confidentiality throughout this process. The documents filed with the
court contain only minimal identifying information 3 and the court
file is to be kept confidential. 9 In addition, the minor may obtain
from the court all copies of court records regarding his admission
once he attains majority. 9 These provisions reflect the legislature's
concern that the child should not be stigmatized by his decision to
seek residential treatment, and its attempt to accomplish this purpose by assuring that safeguards of the child's voluntariness will not
create6 a set of records which could later be used to harm his reputa9
tion.
Taken together, the 1979 amendments concerning voluntary
admissions represent a unique attempt to mitigate perceived difficulties with a statutory system which grants children the right to
commitment hearings.9" These provisions balance recognition of the
child's right to participate in decisions about his treatment with concern that the child's right should be fully protected.
In conclusion, it should be noted that in both the voluntary admission provisions and those governing judicial hearings for involuntary commitment of children, great weight is placed upon the skill
and diligence of the child's attorney. The main burden of explaining
the child's rights rests with his lawyer, as does the responsibility of
Ietermining whether the child wishes to become a voluntary patient
:r to waive a commitment hearing. In addition, the child's only
:hance to have his wishes fully considered depends upon counsel's
89. Id.
90. Id. § 43-1-16(K).
91. Id. § 43-1-16(J).
92. Id. § 43-1-16(K).
93. Neither the attorney's statements or certifications to the court nor the court file itself
may identify the minor by name. The file kept by the court "shall keep the minor's identity
anonymous." Id. § 43-1-16(G).
94. Id.
95. Id. § 43-1-16(H).
96. The common practice in several states of "sealing" various kinds of records concerning
children may provide inadequate protection, since often the only "seal" is a label of "confidential" on the otherwise available folder.
97. The design of this voluntary admission system was suggested by counsel for Vista Sandia
Hospital in 1979.
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efforts to represent those views faithfully. 98 The successful operation
of the entire system largely depends upon the efforts and dedication
of the lawyers who represent these children.
CONSENT TO TREATMENT AND HABILITATION

While many courts and legislatures have addressed the issue of
commitment procedures for minors, far fewer have considered the
problem of consent to other forms of treatment and habilitation.9 9
An ever increasing number of courts have ruled that adults have a
constitutional right to refuse psychiatric treatment,' 00 but little attention has been paid to the effect this right might have on the treatment
of minors. New Mexico's Code, while recognizing the right of adults
to refuse intrusive and hazardous forms of psychiatric treatment,' 0 '
also establishes a different set of consent procedures for juvenile
patients.' 2 Once again, New Mexico's legislative approach is
unique, and its provisions may suggest new directions for other
states to consider as they begin to confront this problem.
Conceptualissues in consent by andfor minors
It is well settled that for an adult's consent to be valid, it must be
voluntary and the patient must be informed and capable of making
the decision involved.' 0 3 While much of the appellate litigation involving surgery has focused on the level of information the patient
possessed at the time he purportedly consented, it is clear that all
three elements-competence, information, and voluntariness-must
98. See note 61 supra; Juvenile Justice Standards Project: Counsel for Private Parties (Tent.
Draft L. Teitelbaum rptr. 1976); Costello, Ethical Issues in Representing Juvenile Clients: A
Review of the IJA/ABA Standards on Representing Private Parties, 10 N.M.L. Rev. __
(1980) [this issue].
99. A. Holder, Legal Issues in Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine 135-57, 237-66 (1977); J.
Wilson, The Rights of Adolescents in the Mental Health System 123-53 (1978); See LegalIssues
in State Mental Health Care: Proposalsfor Change-MentalHealth Treatmentfor Minors, 2
Mental Disability L. Rep. 459-81 (1978).
100. Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D.
Mass. 1979); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), temporary injunctive relief
granted in accordance with opinion, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979); see also Plotkin
Limiting the TherapeuticOrgy: Mental Patients'Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. Rev
461 (1977).
101. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-15 (Repl. 1979).
102. Id. § 43-1-17.
103. See Patterson v. Van Wiel, 91 N.M. 100, 570 P.2d 931 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91
N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977); Demers v. Gerety, 85 N.M. 641, 515 P.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1973)
rev'd and remanded, 86 N.M. 141, 520 P.2d 869, on remand, 87 N.M. 52, 529 P.2d 278 (Ct
App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 47, 529 P.2d 273 (1974).
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be present for consent to serve as a defense in a tort action against
the physician.10 ,
The general rule regarding consent for the treatment of minors has
been that, absent such extraordinary circumstances as emancipation
or emergency, the child's parents have the the authority to consent to
his medical treatment.'0 5 But in recent years, courts and commentators have suggested limitations on such parental powers.' 6 Some
of the same concerns which have led several states to abandon the
authorization of parental commitment of minors also suggest limits
on the desirability of giving parents absolute control over the decision regarding what kind of treatment or habilitation services their
child will receive. The first concern is a desire to protect children
from unnecessary treatment which may be hazardous and intrusive,
but to which his parents may mistakenly consent. A second concern
involves the opposite problem: allowing a child to receive needed
mental health care even if his parents oppose its provision, where the
parental objections appear to be based on concerns other than the
child's interest.'0 7 Finally, there is the consideration that some older
minors have enough maturity and insight to participate in decisions
regarding their own treatment.
These concerns have not led New Mexico to abandon the general
rule of parental consent. A rule which allowed all children to make
all their own treatment decisions would present even more problems.
Each of the three elements of adequate consent entails serious practical difficulties when the consent-giver is a child. Minors, as a
group, have far less information upon which to base medical decisions than adults. Children may also be particularly susceptible to
suggestion and even coercion from treatment-providers or others,
and thus the voluntariness of their consent may be questionable.
Most important, however, is children's lower degree of capacity to
make complex decisions which have important long-term consequences. 08 The issue of their capacity involves not only their level of
intellectual functioning, but also implicates their level of maturity
and the quality of their judgment. The combination of these factors
should make both legislators and treatment-providers skeptical
about any wholesale grant of consent power to minors.
104. See Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 628
(1970).
105. See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
106. See note 99supra.
107. See In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert denied sub
nom. Bothman v. Warren B., 48 U.S.L.W. 3626 (Apr. i, 1980) (No. 79-698).
108. Grisso & Vierling, Minors' Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspective, 9
Professional Psych. 412 (1978).
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Still, it is also true that minors are not a homogeneous groupthey differ widely in their levels of ability, maturity, and judgment.
The traditional rule that minors can have no legal role in decisions
regarding their health care seems as arbitrary and unrealistic as the
rule which would allow all of them the same power to consent that
adults possess."0 9 The New Mexico Code's consent provisions attempt to strike a middle ground between these two extremes.
The Code's approach is to vary the minor's participation in his
treatment decisions according to the nature of the proposed treatment and the age and maturity of the child. The governing principles
are that the child's role should increase with the child's age and experience, and decrease when the proposed treatment involves serious
hazards and intrusiveness. The older the child and the safer the treatment, the greater the legislature's willingness to authorize the child's
participation. For younger children and more serious forms of treatment, the role of the child is reduced or eliminated, and the decisions
are left for others to make on the child's behalf. This calculus is
designed to accomplish two goals: to enhance the minor's participation in treatment decisions to the extent practical, and to protect
children from unwise decisions which could have adverse consequences for their health and future.
To accomplish this balance, the legislature categorized common
forms of treatment according to their intrusiveness, irreversibility,
and hazardousness. ' " At the "less serious" end of this spectrum, the
Code places "talking" therapies which do not involve physical
touching of the patient. At the opposite end of the spectrum are the
more hazardous and intrusive forms of treatment: psychosurgery
and electroconvulsive therapy. Between these extremes are psychotropic medications and behavior modification programs which involve the use of aversive stimuli. The following sections will discuss
the consent procedures for each of these groups.
A. Verbal therapy.
This category of treatment includes the traditional forms of "talking" therapies such as individual psychotherapy and group therapy
that basically involve no physical touching. The Code explicitly excludes any form of treatment which involves aversive stimuli or substantial deprivations (such as a behavior modification program which
uses electric shocks or deprivation of food as negative reinforcers)."'
109. Id.; see also Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
110. N.M. Stat Ann. § 43-1-17 (Repl. 1979). See also Consent Handbook, supra note 64, at
21-28.
111. N.M. Stat. Ann. 43-1-17(A) (Repl. 1979).
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The legislature concluded that this group of treatments posed relatively little risk for children. ' I Verbal therapies are considered to be
far less intrusive than physical forms of treatment. The Code therefore allows any minor to receive such treatment upon his own consent, whether or not he has the agreement of his parents. This provision has several important ramifications.
The first situation to note is the kind which led the legislature to
conclude that a blanket requirement of parental consent was inappropriate for verbal therapy. Some parents may be unable to objectively weigh their child's need for mental health care. The clearest
illustrations of this problem are children who wish to receive professional therapy or guidance to deal with emotional problems stemming from incest or other physical abuse by their parents. In such
cases, requiring parental consent to mental health treatment would
quite likely prevent treatment from being provided. Analogies can be
drawn to other laws allowing teenagers to receive treatment for venereal disease' '1 and drug abuse, as well as abortions"' and contraceptives'" without parental consent. In each case, requiring parental
consent or notification might prevent, rather than just delay, treatment which the minor may desperately need. The balance between
parental prerogative and the minor's medical needs is struck in the
child's favor when such extraordinary circumstances may be
present.
Of course, not every case in which a child seeks mental health
treatment without his parents' consent will involve incest or child
abuse. It may be that the child simply wishes to discuss troubling
emotional problems which he does not feel he can discuss with his
parents. These cases present a closer balance between parental concerns and the child's health needs. Both the difficulty of legislative
line-drawing between different kinds of psychological problems and
the belief that relatively little harm can come from such treatment
led the legislature to make a broad exception to the rule of parental
consent.
112. This is not to say there are no risks involved in verbal therapies. Concerns about
privacy and undue dependence on the therapist are valid, and must be balanced against anticipated benefits of the proposed treatment.
113. As of 1971, only two states (Wisconsin and Wyoming) did not allow minors to consent
unilaterally to treatment for venereal disease. U.S. Dept. of Health, Education & Welfare,
Family Planning: An Analysis of Laws and Policies in the United States 75 (1971). New Mexico law provides that "[alny person, regardless of age, has the capacity to consent to an examination and treatment by a licenced physician for any venereal disease." N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 24-1-9 (Repl. 1979).
114. See cases cited in note 109 supra.
115. See N.M. Stat Ann. § 24-8-5 (Repl. 1979); see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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It is also important to note that the provision which exempts verbal therapy from the requirement of parental consent does not grant
all minors legal capacity to consent to such treatment. Granting
minors the "right" to consent does not transform all children into
individuals with sufficient maturity and capacity to give legally valid
consent to therapy.'", Many juveniles, especially younger children,
will certainly lack such capacity. The statute only provides that if a
minor has the factual capacity to understand what is being proposed
and to give or withhold consent, he need not obtain his parents' concurrence before obtaining treatment.
The Code does not address the situation in which a minor lacks the
factual ability to make his own decisions regarding verbal therapy.
Presumably the parents of such a minor retain their common law
right to grant or withhold consent on his behalf. A more difficult
question is whether such a child can somehow receive treatment
without parental consent. Since the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code is silent on the subject, courts would have to
look to other provisions of law for an answer. The courts' power to
provide for neglected children under the Children's Code' '"might
provide a starting point, but this solution would only be available in
relatively drastic circumstances. "8s In other cases, relief from the rule
of parental consent may not be available.
The verbal therapy provisions attempt to strike a balance between
highly valued competing interests. The legislature sketched its
choices in relatively broad terms. A more detailed approach to this
problem may not be possible in the form of legislation, and the
details of implementation may require case-by-case evaluation by
the courts.
B. Psychosurgery and convulsive therapy.
These forms of treatment are quite drastic, especially when the patient is a child. Psychosurgery encompasses surgical procedures in
[Tlhere is little evidence that minors of age 15 and above as a group are any less
competent to provide consent than are adults. In the age range of 11-14 years,
existing research suggests caution regarding any assumptions about these
minors' abilities to consider intelligently the complexities of treatment alternatives, risks, and benefits, or to provide consent that is voluntary. Most
research suggests that minors below age 11 generally do not have the intellectual abilities or are too prone to deferent response to satisfy a psychological
interpretation of the legal standard for competent consent.
Grisso & Vierling, supra note 108, at 423.
117. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-3(L) (Supp. 1979); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-34 (1978).
118. See Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975); Areen, Intervention
Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse
Cases, 63 Geo. L.J. 887 (1975); Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children:
A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 985 (1975).
116.
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which the brain operation is designed to affect thoughts and behavior. 119 It is a most intrusive procedure, and carries with it irreversible
consequences.1 0 Convulsive therapy, which is most frequently performed by passing an electric current through the patient's brain but
may involve the administration of drugs such as insulin, represents a
somewhat lower degree of intrusiveness and irreversibility," 2 ' but it
to be an inappropriate form of
is believed by most psychiatrists
22
treatment for children.'

While the legislature did not outlaw these forms of treatment in
cases involving children, it did note the increasing regulation of these
treatments by courts and legislatures of other states,' 23 and chose to
make such treatment available only upon court order.' 2 A child may
receive psychosurgery or convulsive therapy only when a court is
convinced that the proposed treatment "is necessary to prevent
serious harm to the minor. "'' It seems likely that very few such
cases will arise and that their adjudication will not greatly burden the
courts. Nevertheless, the protection of children from the potential
harm of ill-advised use of these forms of treatment warrants substantial procedural safeguards.
C. Psychotropic medications and aversive conditioning.
These forms of treatment and habilitation are neither as harmless
as verbal therapy nor as hazardous and unusual as psychosurgery
legislature enacted a different
and convulsive therapy. Therefore the
2
type of consent procedure for them.' 6
Medications for the treatment of mental illness have worked a
genuine revolution in mental health care in the last 25 years. They
119. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-3(P) (Repl. 1979).
120. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil Action No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct.
Wayne County, Mich. July 10, 1973); see also National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Dept. of HEW, Report and Recommendations: Psychosurgery (1977); S. Shuman, Psychosurgery and the Medical Control of
Violence (1977); Operating on the Mind: The Psychosurgery Conflict (W. Gaylin, J.Meister &
R. Neville eds. 1975).
121. For a comprehensive review of the literature on electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), see
Note, Regulation of Electroconvulsive Therapy, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 363 (1976).
122. A poll by the American Psychiatric Association of 2,973 psychiatrists revealed that
only 16% thought ECT should be administered to children aged 16 or under. Am. Psychiatric
Ass'n, Electroconvulsive Therapy 4 (Task Force Rep. 14, 1978).
123. See notes 120, 121 supra; see also Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 535 (1976).
124. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-17(B)(Repl. 1979).
125. Id.
126. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-17(C). This discussion will focus on psychotropic medications.
The legislature concluded that the balance of interests regarding aversive conditioning was
roughly comparable. See Friedman, Legal Regulation of Applied Behavior Analysis in Mental
Institutions and Prisons, 17 Ariz. L. Rev. 39 (1975).
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have enabled some patients to receive verbal therapy who would not
have been able to profit from it had not the medicines been available. They have also made it possible for many patients to receive
treatment on an out-patient basis who would have been institutionalized in earlier times. Recognition of the value of these drugs is
nearly universal. 2, 7
Psychotropic medications also present serious problems.
Foremost among these are the physical side effects which may
accompany their use. These undesirable effects are both numerous
and serious. Perhaps the most troubling is tradive dyskinesia, an irreversible form of brain damage which can produce uncontrollable
facial contortions and other serious symptoms.' 28 These side effects,
coupled with the extremely widespread use of such drugs, have led
courts and legal commentators to call for careful limitations on their
use.' 29 There is additional reason for concern when the patient
receiving the medications is a minor, because the long-term effects
of the drugs are somewhat less clear for children than for adults. 3'o
The extraordinary promise of psychotropic medications when
properly prescribed, coupled with their serious side effects, produce
a legislative dilemma regarding consent. Considerable risks would be
involved in giving minors the right to consent to such potent forms
of treatment. Errors of judgment could have serious consequences,
and minors need protection from such errors. On the other hand,
placing limitations on drugs comparable to those provided for psychosurgery would make it impractical to treat the large number of
children who currently benefit from these medications. The courts
would soon be filled with petitions for medication treatment, and
either the treatment would not be provided or else the petitions
127. See generally Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Pharmocotherapy and
Psychotherapy: Paradoxes, Problems and Progress (1975). However, it is also recognized that
psychotropic medications alter behavior by ameliorating symptoms, but do not constitute a
"cure." Symptoms frequently return when the medications are discontinued. See 5 American
Handbook of Psychiatry 441-513 (2d ed. S. Arieti ed. 1975); 2 Comprehensive Textbook of
Psychiatry 1921-27 (2d ed. A. Freedman, H. Kaplan & B. Sadock eds. 1975); Byck, Drugs and
the Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, in The Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics 152 (5th
ed. L. Goodman & A. Gilman eds. 1975).
128. 3 Drugs in Institutions: Hearings on S. Res. 72, § 12 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
127-35 (1975) (statement of Dr. Herbert A. Wendel).
129. See Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), temporary injunctive relief
granted in accordance with opinion, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979); Plotkin, supra note 100;
Sprague & Baxley, Drugs for Behavior Management, with Comments on Some Legal Aspects,
in 10 Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities: An Annual Review 92 (J. Wortis ed.
1978).
130. See Pediatric Psychopharmacology: The Use of Behavior Modifying Drugs in Children
(J. Werry ed. 1978).
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would be routinely approved without thoughtful consideration of
the child's needs. Neither roadblocks nor rubberstamp procedures
are appropriate for drug therapy.
The Code provides that for children under the age of fourteen, the
parents have the authority to give or withhold consent. 3 ' For these
younger children, any direct participation in the treatment decision
will take place informally at the initiative of the parents or the doctor, because the Code specifies no role for the child. For minors who
are fourteen and older, a system of concurrent consent has been
devised. If the older minor is factually able to grant consent, his
agreement will be sufficient unless his parents object.' 3 2 If the
parents do object, or if the minor lacks the capacity to grant consent,
or if the minor refuses to consent to proposed treatment, a mechanism for substitute consent by a third party is provided.' 33 This
proxy consent mechanism involves the appointment of a treatment
guardian, as provided for adults elsewhere in the Code. 3
As was the case with the provisions previously discussed, the consent section for minors attempts to strike a balance between the risks
posed by the treatment involved and the consensual abilities of the
minors for whom the treatment is proposed. In cases involving
younger children, the power to give or withhold consent is granted to
the parents on the grounds that children under fourteen will not be
able to comprehend fully the consequences of such a complex and
serious decision. A significant number of older teenagers should be
able to participate meaningfully in decisions regarding their treatment, and they are granted a say in such decisions. Even for these
older minors there is a perceived need to protect them from the consequences of an unwise decision-thus the provisions for parental
objection and third party decision-making.
131. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-17 (Repl. 1979):
C. Psychotropic medications and behavior modification programs involving aversive stimuli or substantial deprivations may be administered to minors
under the age of fourteen only with the consent of the minor's parent or guardian. Such treatment may be administered to minors fourteen years of age and
older with the consent of the minor unless his parent or guardian objects. If the
consent of the minor is not obtained, or his parent or guardian objects, and the
treatment provider or another interested person believes that the administration of the drug or program is necessary to protect the minor from serious
harm, any interested party may petition the court for appointment of a treatment guardian under the same procedures as provided in Section 43-1-15
NMSA 1978.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. § 43-1-15. For a general discussion of limited purpose guardianship, see Note,
Limited Guardianshipfor the Mentally Retarded, 8 N.M.L. Rev. 231 (1978).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

These consent provisions reflect a judgment that older minors are
more capable of making or participating in treatment decisions, and
should therefore be treated differently from younger children. The
choice of a cutoff age here, as was true with a similar cutoff involving the ability to enter residential treatment voluntarily, 3 ' is a
somewhat arbitrary exercise. But this kind of rough categorical
measure of minors' abilities' 3 6 grants decisional rights to most
minors who are able to exercise them without burdening the treatment and judicial systems with the need for a case-by-case inquiry
into the abilities of each child. In this respect, these provisions
resemble other legal judgments which arbitrarily affect the rights of
young people, such as minimum age requirements for voting, driving, and other activities. Their inherent inaccuracy with regard to the
abilities of specific children are justified by their utility in reducing
both administrative and judicial burdens.
D. Consent provisions generally.
The balances and compromises struck by the Code regarding
minors' consent are rough and imperfect. New Mexico has gone further than other states in its attempt to tailor consent rules to the
nature of the proposed treatment and to the ability of the child. The
Code may provide a model for other states which wish to modify the
rule of parental consent in order to recognize the rights and abilities
of juveniles.
CONFIDENTIALITY OF RECORDS
Despite the efforts of voluntary associations and mental health
professions, a stigma still attaches to those who have been labeled
mentally ill or mentally retarded.' 3 7 This stigma can affect an individual's life in many ways, limiting his access to educational and
employment opportunities. Thus adults who receive treatment for
mental illness or habilitation for mental retardation have a
legitimate interest in assurance that information about their condition or past condition will not be made public. Without such
assurance, some potential clients may not seek needed treatment or
habilitation because of fear that the stigma will outweigh any bene135. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-16 (Repl. 1979); see text accompanying note 80supra.
136. See note 116 supra; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 n.3 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
137. R. Edgerton, The Cloak of Competence: Stigma in the Lives of the Mentally Retarded
(1967); E. Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (1963); see also In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1(1967).
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fits they might gain. These considerations led the legislature to provide rather strict protections of clients' confidentiality. 38
The same concerns also affect children and their parents, and
therefore the Code provides protections of the child's privacy which
are tailored to the special needs of children and of family situations. 113
In general, children receive the same protection of privacy and
confidentiality which the Code provides for adults. The legislature
established as a general principle that no information about a client
which might reveal the client's identity may be transmitted unless the
proposed recipient has a need to obtain that information, or unless
the client has consented to the release. "I Thus the presumption is
that the client will control access to his own records. This control is
accompanied in most circumstances by access of the client to his own
records.'" The only exception to the principle of client control are
those specified in the statute. 2
The most important of these exceptions for adults are (1) cases in
which treatment professionals working to serve the client need to
share information with each other, and (2) cases in which serious
bodily harm to the client or others might occur unless information is
revealed.'4 3 Both exceptions also apply when the client is a minor,
and there would appear to be nothing in the nature of minority
which would make these provisions inappropriate for children.
But the legislature concluded that there were two other exceptions
to the rule of client control which were appropriate only in cases involving children. This conclusion is based on the assumption that
because of their immaturity, children require special provisions to
protect both their treatment and privacy rights.
The first exception allows the provider of services to release information to the child's parents when that release "is essential for the
treatment of the minor . . . ."" This provision makes clear that
138. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-19 (Repl. 1979). For comparison, see Legal Issues in State
Mental Health Care: Proposalsfor Change- Therapeutic Confidentiality, 2 Mental Disability
L. Rep. 337-54 (1977).
139. For comparison, see Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposalsfor ChangeMental Health Treatmentfor Minors, 2 Mental Disability L. Rep. 459, 471-72, 480-81 (1978).
See also In re J.C.G., 144 N.J. Super. 579, 366 A.2d 733 (1976); McGuire, Confidentialityand
the Child in Psychotherapy, 5 Professional Psych. 374 (1974).
140. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-19(A) (Repl. 1979).
141. Id. § 43-1-19(D).
142. Id. § 43-1-19(B).
143. For perspective on service provider liability in this area, see Tarasoff v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551, P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976); Wexler, Patients,
Therapists, and Third Parties: The Victimological Virtues of Tarasoff, 2 Int'l J.L. & Psych. 1
(1979).
144. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-19(B)(3) (Repl. 1979).
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the child's confidentiality extends even to general releases of privileged information to his parents. This is particularly important
because a bond of confidentiality may be necessary to establish the
degree of trust needed for successful therapy, and because the child
will often wish to discuss aspects of his family relationships confidentially. An inflexible rule that information could not be shared
with the parents, however, appeared to be excessively harsh, and a
1978 amendment allows the therapist to share information with the
parents under limited conditions. The requirement that the release to
the parents be essential for the purposes of treatment is quite general, and therefore grants the therapist a great deal of latitude to use
professional judgment in deciding what, if anything, to tell the
parents. The grant of discretion to the service-provider recognizes
that this is an area of extreme sensitivity, and any blanket rule which
attempted to regulate the professional's judgment with any specificity could potentially cause serious harm to the child, his treatment,
and his family. The success or failure of this provision will depend
on the care and judgment which professionals exercise in its implementation.
The other difference between adults and minors regarding confidentiality involves the client's decision to authorize the release of
information. Whether the client is an adult or a minor, his consent to
release information must meet general consent requirements: capacity, information, and voluntariness.' 4 5 When a client is not capable
of making his own decision regarding the release of information, the
Code provides for substitute consent.' 6 But because the legislature
concluded that younger children, as a class, lack sufficient maturity
to make their own decisions regarding important matters,'" it provides that parents of children under fourteen have the authority to
give or withhold consent for the release of information.'4 8 Once
again the legislature has attempted to balance the child's approximate abilities against the potential harm from an erroneous decision
by protecting those children whose decisions are most likely to be unwise.
As with consent, New Mexico's provisions regarding disclosure
are unique, attempting to recognize and accommodate both the
privacy interest and the treatment needs of the client, even when the
client is a minor.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See note 104 supra.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-19(E) (Repl. 1979).
See text accompanying note 108 supra.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-19(E) (Repl. 1979).
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CONCLUSION
The Code extends other rights to children which have not been
discussed in this article, such as the right to individualized treatment
or habilitation' 9 and the right to education." ' But the provisions
discussed in this article suggest a new approach to children's mental
health and retardation services. They represent a unique legislative
attempt to balance competing rights and competing interests. The
child's liberty and treatment interests receive the greatest attention
and protection, but the special vulnerability and immaturity of
children have also been taken into account. For judges and treatment-providers, implementing the Code requires that challenging
and demanding decisions be made regarding individual children. For
other states considering new legislation, the Code suggests a new approach to children's needs which they may profitably adapt to their
own situation.

149. Id. § 43-1-9.
150. Id. § 43-1-18.

